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ALCOHOL CONTROL POLICIES AND MOTOR VEHICLE FATALITiES
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to estimate the effectsof drunk
driving deterrents and other alcohol related policies on drunk
driving. The data set employed is an annual time-series of state
cross-sections for the 48 contiguous states of the U.S. from 1982
through 1988. Total and alterative alcohol involved motor vehicle
fatality rates, for the general population and for 18 to 20 year olda,
are used as measures of drunk driving. The results indicate that the
moat effective policies are increased beer taxes and mandatory
administrative license actions. Maintaining the beer tax at its real
1951 value would have reduced fatalities by 11.5 percent annually, on
average, during the sample period. A mandatory administrative license
sanction of one year would have reduced fatalities by 9 percent. The
next most effective policies are a 21 year old legal drinking age,
preliminary breath test and dram shop laws and relatively large
mandatory fines. These policies each reduce total fatalities by about
5 to 6 percent. No plea bargaining provisions and mandatory license
sanctions upon conviction are also found to have some deterrent
effect. Other drunk driving laws tested include mandatory jail
sentences and community service optiona, illegal per ae laws, and open
container laws. None of these were found to have a deterrent effect
on drunk driving.
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Since the mid-1970's, the Federal and various state and local governments have
campaigned to reduce motor vehicle fatalities by discouraging alcohol abuse. One part of
this campaign was the Alcohol Traffic Safety Act of 1983. This act provides financial
incentives for states to enact and enforce new, more stringent drunk driving laws. These
measures include certain and more severe penalties upon conviction for drunken driving, an
easing of the standards required for conviction, and the increased allocation of resources for
the apprehension of drunken drivers. A second part of this campaign was the Federal
Uniform Drinking Age Act of 1984. This act pressured all states into raising the minimum
legal drinking age to 21 for all alcoholic beverages. States that were slow to respond were
penalized by having part of their federal highway funding withheld. Ross (1990) reports that
between 1980 and 1990 over 500 new drunk driving laws were passed in the United States.
These new drunk driving laws are intended to both punish and deter. The deterrence
effect depends on the assumption of rational behavior. While driving when drunk may not
he rational, the joint decision to drink and then drive can be modeled as a rational decision.
Becker (1968), assuming rational behavior, describes the deterrent effect of legislation in a
model of expected utility. Becker shows that the number of offenses committed by an
individual is negatively related to the cost of each offense. The cost of each offense is a
positive function of the probabilities of arrest and conviction and the severity of punishment
if convicted.
The purpose of this study is to estimate the effects of drunk driving deterrence laws
and other alcohol control policies on drunk driving. Prior research does not provide an
unambiguous assessment of the effects of these laws. Many early studies used interrupted
time series analysis which may not be the most appropriate method for studying the effects
of drunk driving laws. Also, most of these studies consider only one law. This study is
important because the effects of all major drunk driving laws, as well as those of minimum
legal drinking ages and alcohol excise taxes, are estimated simultaneously. The second novel
aspect of this study is the use of an estimated, alcohol involved driver fatality rate. This
variable was constructed using information on the blood alcohol concentration of driverskilled in fatal crashes. An annual time-series of state cross-sections is used to estimate these
models. This type of data set is important since it allows for estimation of more subtle
effects than can be detected with a univariate time series.
Several recent studies have examined the effects of various drunk driving laws, Ross
(1985) reviews a number of these studies and concludes that laws which increase the
perceived certainty of punishment have a short term effectiveness. However, he concludes
that the laws have little impact in the long run due to a decline in the public's perception
that the laws will be enforced. Ross (1984) also reviews research on deterrents in the
United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. He finds
that there is evidence of a deterrence effect in these countries, the magnitude of which
varies with the perception that the laws will be enforeed.
Mosknwitz (1989) also reviews several studies of drunk driving deterrence laws and
concludes that the deterrence approach has litrle effect on behavior. Drunk driving laws,
according to Moskowitz, are useful to the extent that they communicate the community's
concern about the problem.
Evans, et. al. (1989) use a cross sectional time series data set for 48 states over the
period from 1975 to 1986 in their study of seven anti-drunk driving laws. They examine
preliminary breath tests, sobriety checkpoints, no plea bargaining provisions, mandatory jail
sentences, illegal per se and open container laws, and administrative license sanctions. None
of these measures, with the possible exception of breath tests and sobriety cheek points, are
found to have any effect on motor vehicle fatalities. However, they defined all drunk driving
deterrence laws as dichotomous variables and only estimate fixed effects models. The
resuhing eollinearity between staLe and lime dummies and their dichotomous law indicators
may mask the effects of the laws.
Zador, et al. (1988) study the effect of per se laws, adinirsistrative license action laws,
and mandatory jail or comntunity service laws using cross sectional time series data for the
48 states from 1978 to 1985. All three laws are found to have a significant negative effect
on highway fatalities.
Saffer and Chaloupka (1989) use a cross sectional time series data set for 48 states
over the period from 1980 to 1985 to examine the effects of preliminary breath test laws.
2Using a variety of fatality rates and specifications, they find that the preliminary breath test
significantly reduces motor vehicle fatality rates.
Kenkel (1990) studies The effects of preliminary breath tests, mandatory penalties,
administrative per se laws and no plea bargaining laws, using a micro data sd taken from
the 1985 Health Interview Survey. The outcome measures are self-reported alcohol
consumption and self-reported drunk driving. He finds evidence that these laws, with the
exception of the no plea bargaining law, deter heavy drinking. However, holding the effect
of the laws on heavy drinking constant, no independent effect on drunk driving is observed.
Kenkel's results also lend some support to the notion that is the joint decision to drink and
then drive which can he modeled as a rational behavior.
Il.EmpiricalSpecification
The empirical model is derived from a theoretical model consisting of two equations.
The first equation is a production function relating the probability a fatal motor vehicle
accident (ir) to an individual's alcohol consumption shortly before or while driving (y) and
a vector of additional variables (z).
= ir(y,z) (1)
The a vector includes variables which measure traffic density, roadway conditions, vehicle
quality and other motor vehicle safety measures. The second equation is the demand for
alcohol shortly before or while driving:
y=y(p,a,c,f,l) (2)
which is a function of the price of alcohol (p), the prohabilities of apprehension (a) and
conviction (e) for drunk driving, a vector of the penalties associated with apprehension and
conviction (I), and a vector of other variables affecting alcohol demand (I). The vector I
includes income, the prices of alcohol complements and substitutes, laws affecting the
availability of alcohol, alcohol sentiment and other measures of taste.
Substituting the alcohol demand equation into the probability of a motor vehicle
fatality equation yields a reduced form probability equation:
ir=ir(p,a,c,f,l,z) (3)
which can be aggregated across individuals to yield an empirically estimable probability of
3a motor vehicle accident fatality equation.
ilL Data
The data set employed in this study is a time series of state cross sections for the 48
contiguous states of the U.S. covering the years from 1982 through 1988.1 Means and
summary definitions of all variables are found in Table 1.
Motor vehicle fatality rates are the best empirical measures of drunk driving
available.2 While not all motor vehicle fatalities are the result of drunk driving, there is a
strong correlation between the two measures. Several alternative fatality rates, based on the
information contained in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA)
Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS), are employed to measure drunk driving. The
FARS contains data on all motor vehicle accident fatalities by state of occurrence.
The first fatality rate includes all motor vehicle accident fatalities and is called the
total fatality rate. In an attempt to focus on alcohol involvement in motor vehicle fatalities
and in isolate the impact of the DUI laws on driver behavior, two additional, driver specific
fatality rates are defined. The first driver specific fatality rate is limited to drivers who died
between 12:00 a.m. and 3:59 a.m., and is called the night driver fatality rale. The NHTSA
estimates that 75-90% of these drivers had been drinking.
The second driver specific fatality rate uses the information contained in the FARS
on the blood alcohol concentration of drivers killed in fatal crashes. No other study of dronk
driving employs a fatality rate constructed from these BAC data. Since the BAC data is not
collected for all drivers killed in a fatal accident, the alcohol involved driver fatality rate was
estimated. This fatality rate is based on the fraction of the dead drivers tested and the
fraction of those tested with I3AC's of at least 0.05%, based on most states definition of
alcohol involvement.
In addition, three similar, age specific fatality rates are defined for youths ages 18
1Masksand Hawaii were omitted from the data set because several important variables were missing
for these two states. The Oistrict of Columbia is excluded because its else and nature make it likely that
many of its motor vehicle accidents invoWe nooresidents.
Fatality data is preferred to accident data due to the variability in reporting standards across states for
accident data.
4years to 20 years.3 Alcohol involvement in motor vehicle accidents is estimated to be three
times higher in the 18 to 20 year old group than it is in the overall population. It is,
therefore, particularly important to examine the effects of alcohol regulations on this age
group.
Each fatality rate is computed as the relevant number of motor vehicle accident
deaths divided by the relevant state population. The fatality equation is specified as a
logistic equation. The logistic functional form is ideal since it constrains the fatality rate to
lie between zero and one. The logistic specification is obtaioed by transforming the fatality
rate to ln[M/(1-M)], where M is the fatality rate and in is the natural logarithm. Maddala
(1983) shows that weighted least squares should be uscd with this logistic transformation.
The weight is LnM(1-M)J, where n is the relevant state population.
An extensive set of variables are included as indicators of the various state laws
related to alcohol use and/or driving under the influence of alcohol. These laws include:
implied consent laws; illegal and administrative per se Laws; minimum legal drinking ages for
alcoholic beverages; preliminary breath test laws; open container laws; no plea bargaining
laws; laws specil'ing mandatory minimum penalties for conviction of driving under the
influence; and dram shop statutes or case laws. These laws represent all important DUI
legislation.1 All law variables were constructed from the information provided in the
NHTSA's annual compilation ADigest of State Alcohol-Highway SafctlLRelated Legislation.
An implied consent law presumes that an individual with a driver's license agrees to
be tested for alcohol and other drugs upon request or face a license suspension or
revocation. This law is modeled with two variables: a dichotomous indicator of whether or
not a state has a statute calling for a minimum driver license suspension or revocation upon
first refusal to submit to a blood, breath, or urine test for alcohol; and the length, in days,
'Several other fatality rates were also cooso-ucted from the FARS data. Results for these can be found
in Grossman, Sailer, and Chaloupka t1991).
'An additional measure used irs other studies which represents an increase in the probability of arrest
is the use of roadside sobriety checkpoints. Based on conversations with the NI-ITSA, the roadside
checkpoints can not be captured in the data employed in this study due to the use of sobriety checkpoints
in all states and the lack of data on how extensively checkpoints are used within a stare.
5of the mandatory license suspension or revocation associated with the first refusal (zero for
states without a first refusal implied consent law). Through 1988, 38 states and the District
of Columbia had implied consent laws with suspensions or revocations from 30 days to one
year.
Illegal per se Laws make it no offense to operate a motor vehicle with a BAC at or
above some specified level. Under these laws, a BAC at or ahove the specified level is
sufficient proof to convict an individual for drunk driving. The only relevant rebuttable
evidence is that the test was administered incorrectly. Through 1988,allbut 6 states had
illegal per se laws for BAC levels ranging from 0.08 percent to 0.12 percent. Three
dichotomous variables are defined to capture these laws. The first is one if a state has an
illegal per se BAC of 0.08 percent, and is zero otherwise. Similar variables are defined for
a BAC of 0.10 percent, the most common, and for a BAC of over 0.10percent.The
omitted category is states with no illegal per se laws.
Some states have also enacted administrative per se laws which may require the state
licensing agency to suspend or revoke an individual's license after arrest for DU!. In many
states, this action is mandatory when the individual's BAC exceeds a specified level
(generally 0.10 percent). The administrative action is independent of any later court penalty.
Two variables are defined to capture these administrative license actions. The first is a
dichotomous indicator equal to one in states requiring an administrative license suspension
or revocation for the first arrest for DUI, and is zero otherwise (including states allowing
discretionary administrative sanctions). The second is the mandatory minimum license
action, in days, associated with the law (zero for states with no mandatory administrative
sanctions). Through 1988, 15 states had mandatory, administrative license saneLions of 10
to 180 days, effective at BAC levels ranging from 0.08 percent to 0.13 percent.
The state minimum legal purchase age for beer, alcohol content greater than 3.2
percent, is included in all estimated equations. By the end of the sample period, all states
had minimum ages of 21 for all alcoholic beverages. However, many enacted grandfather
clauses when raising their drioking ages, exempting state residents of legal age prior to theincrease. The drinking age measure employed in this study accounts for these clauses.5
Finally,ifa state raised its legal age during the year, the drinking age variable is the
weighted average of the ages in effect during the year.'
The preliminary breath test variable is a dichotomous indicator equal to one if a state
has a law authorizing the pre-arrest use of a preliminary breath test to establish probable
cause for arrest for DUI, and is equal to zero otherwise. These laws allow the police to
administer the breath test without the assistance of medical personnel. Through 1988, 25
states had statutes allowing the use of a preliminary breath test.
•
In several states, it is an offense to have an open container of an alcoholic beverage
in the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle. Open container laws arc modeled by
including a dichotomous variable equal to one if a state has an open container law and equal
to zero otherwise. At the end of 1988, 21 states had open container laws.
In the past, an individual charged with DU! might negotiate a plea bargain to reduce
the charge to a non alcohol-related offense, such as reckless operation, carrying a less severe
penalty. To eliminate plea bargains, some states now require prosecutors to try an individual
for DUI if they are arrested for 001, unless a written statement is filed indicating why the
charge should be reduced. This is modeled by a dichotomous variable which is one if the
state has a no plea bargaining law and is zero otherwise. Through 1988, twelve states
restricted the use of plea bargaining in DUE cases.
Additionally, several states have dram shop laws which allow a person injured by an
intoxicated individual to bring suit against the person or establishment serving the alcoholic
beverages. This variable is one if the state has either a statute or case law clearly
• authorizing such a lawsuit and is equal to zero otherwise. 35 states had such statutes at the
end of 1988, with case laws in an additionat 4 states and the District of Columbia.
Thts was done by taking a weighted average of the daily effective drinkingagein the state. For
example, in a state raising its drinking age from 20 to 21 on January 1st, but grandfathers individuals 20
years of age prior to January 1st, the average drinking age for the year would be: 20+at i)/365'.
'Saffer and Grossman (1987a,b) find that drinking age related youth border crossing is an important
determinant of youth motor vehicle fatality rates from 1975 through 1981. Similar variables were included
in the equations presenred below. However, these had little impact in this sample, probably due to the
unifonnicy of drinking ages and the fact that the grandfather clauses pertain to stare residents only.
7At the end of 1988, 35 states and the District of Columbia had laws calling for
mandatory minimum penalties to be imposed upon the first conviction for DUE These
include dollar fines, driver license suspensinn or revocation, and jail sentences. In some
states, more than one penalty may be imposed. Additionally, some states allow an individual
to engage in a minimum amount of court approved community service in lieu of a jail
sentence. Eight variables were defined to capture these mandatory sanctions. Separate,
dichotomous indicators were defined as one in states requiring a mandatory minimum fine,
license actinn, nr jail sentence upon first conviction for DUE An additional dichotnmous
indicator was defined for states allowing community service in lieu of jail. Finally, four
continuous variables were defined for the mandatory minimum penalties; the fine, in 1967
dollars; the license sanction, in days; the jail sentence, in days; and the community service,
in hours. These variables are zero for states which do not require the relevant mandatory
penalty. Through 1988, 16 states had mandatory fines for the first conviction ranging from
$50 to $500. Similarly, 24 states and the District of Columbia either suspended or revoked
an individual's driver license from 15 days up to 1 year. Finally, 15 states mandated a jail
sentence of from 1 to 3 days, with 9 of these allnwing from 8 to 100 hours of community
service in lieu of the jail term.
Ideally, the impact of penalties for drunken driving would be modeled empirically hy
three variables;
a-1 =a0+ a1D + a5D1S + a3(1-D1)S (4)
where r1 is the fatality rate in state j, D is the dichotomous indicator of a mandatory
minimum sanction in state j, S is the mandatory minimum sanction in statej, and S is the
discretionary average sanction in states with no mandatory minimum penalties. Thus, the
impact of the sanction is shown by a2 and a3, with the effect allowed to differ depending on
the nature of the sanctinn. The impact of requiring a mandatory penalty, implying greater
certainty of punishment, is shown by a1. Comparing the average fatality rnte in states with




8where S" and S° are the average penalties imposed in each type of state. Hence,
ir"-r° a1+a,S"-ct)S. (7)
The problem, however, with estimating equation (4) is that no data is available on
.1 the average penalties imposed in states with no mandatory minimum penalties. Assuming
that average penalties in stales without mandatory minimums do not vary, unbiased
• estimates of a5 can be obtained from:
8 + B1D + a2D1S. (8)
where 8 = a0 + a5S0 and B = a1 - a5S°. Thus, the impact of more severe mandatory
minimum penalties can be found directly from a2, but the effect of having a mandatory
• minimum penalty can not be found without information on the average penalties imposed
in states without mandatory penalties, If more severe mandatory minimum penalties act as
deterrents, as expected, a will be negative. However, the sign on B, the coefficient on the
indicator of a mandatory penalty, is ambiguous. a. is expected to be negative, since having
a mandatory penalty increases the probability of a penalty and, as a result, the expected cost
of drunken driving, a5, though, is also expected to be negative, since increased avenge
penalties for drunken driving are expected to deter individuals from driving drunk.
• This model applies to the mandatory minimum fine, license sanction, and jail sentence
variables. In addition, the estimation of equation (8) for an implied consent law provides
both the impact of having an implied consent law and the effect of the mandatory minimum
• penalties associated with the law, since states without implied consent laws impose no
penalties upon refusal to submit to tests. Finally, a slightly more complicated version of this
model applies to administrative per se laws.
In all equations, the price of alcohol is measured by the excise tax rate on beer.
Excise tax data are the most reliable price data available. Beer tax data were chosen since
beer is the most popular alcoholic beverage in the U.S. and because meaningful wine and
distilled spirits taxes are only available for states which permit the sale of all alcoholic
beverages in licensed establishments. The beer tax variable is defined as the sum of the
Federal and state excise tax rates on a case of 24-12 ounce containers of beer, in 1967
dollars. The Federal tax had been fixed at 64 cents from 1951 until recently when it was
doubled as part of a deficit reduction package. State excise tax rates were obtained from
• 9the U.S. Brewers Association's annual Brewers Almanac. If a state raised its tax during the
year, the tax is computed as the weighted average of the rates in effect throughout the year.
Five other alcohol related variables are included in all equations as measures of
unobserved exogenous sentiment towards alcohoL For example, anti-alcohol sentiment
should be relatively widespread in states in which religious groups opposing alcohol are
prevalent or in states in which a higher than average fraction of the population reside in
counties prohihiting the sale of alcohol. Thus, variahles are defined for the percentages of
the state population who arc Mormons, Southern Baptists, other Protestants, and Catholics.
These data were available from Lhe National Council of Churches for 1971 and 1980 only.
Estimates for 1982 through 1988 were computed by logarithmic trend. The final sentiment
variable is the percentage of the state population residing in"dry" counties, taken from the
Brewers Almanac.
Failing to control for sentiment may bias coefficients on the deterrence measures and
the other determinanLs of alcohol demand. For example, states with strong anti-drinking
sentiment may enact high alcohol taxes and drunk driving deterrent measures as part of the
political process. Thus, if sentiment is excluded from the fatality equations, the estimated
coefficients on taxes and the drunk driving laws overstate the effects of these variables.
Alternatively, states with pro-drinking sentiment mighL enact higher taxes on alcohol, since
these are a good source of revenues. If this is the case, then the estimated tax coefficients
understate the true effects of taxes when sentiment is excluded.
Real per capita personal income and the state unemployment rate are also included
in all equations. Income should be positively related to the demand for alcohol and health,
as well as to the quality and condition of motor vehicles. Thus, the predicted effect of
income on fatality rates is ambiguous. Unemployment may be a stress factor increasing
alcohol consumption, but may reduce driving because of reduced work related travel, as well
as lead to lesa drinking away from home. The unemployment data are taken from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics' Oeogrphical PLof,leJf Employment and Unemployrncnt.
Additionally, five variables are used to control for the probability of a fatal motor
vehicle accideot. They are the percentage of highway traffic exceeding 65 miles per hour,
the number of vehicle miles traveled in 10(1,000's of miles per licensed driver, the fraction
10of licensed drivers ages 24 years and under, a dichotomous indicator for states requiring
annual safety inspections of all motor vehicles and a dichotomous indicator of a mandatory
seat belt use law. The first three of Lhese variables were computed using data from the
Federal Highway Administration's Hiahwav Statistics, and unpublished data provided by the
FHA. The safety inspection indicator was taken from the American Automobile
Association's Digest of Motor Laws. Finally, information on mandatory seat belt use laws
was obtained from communications with the NHTSA.
Vehicle miles per driver reflect molor vehicle usc and traffic density and should be
positively related to fatality rates. According to Peltzman (1975), because young drivers have
a higher demand for risky driving, they are more likely to have an accident than older
drivers. Thus, an increase in the fraction of young drivers should have a positive effect on
fatality rates. Similarly, vehicle speed should also have a positive effect on fatality rates, with
deviation from the average speed also having a positive effect (Lave, 1985). Thus, an
increase in the percentage of drivers exceeding 65 mph on highways should lead to higher
fatality rates. Ukewise, mandatory safety inspections should result in safer vehicles and, as
a result, lower fatal accident rates. Lastly, increased seat belt use resulting from the
mandatory seat belt use laws should reduce the probability of a fatal accident.
Finally, temporal variation in unmeasured variables and other time trends are
modeled by a set of dichotomous variables for each of the years from 1982 through 1987.
IV. Regression Results
• A- Introduction
The empirical specifications are designed primarily to address problems associated
with an extensive list of potential independent variables. There are 11 drunk driving laws
that have been identified by NHTSA as important legislation. Several of these Jaws must
be modeled with two or more empirical variables. Also, many of these laws were enacted
at the same time. The number of variables and the simultaneous enactment of the laws can
create collinearity in the data set. Collinearity problems may be reduced by limiting the
number of variables in the models. The exclusion of correlated variahtes, however, can
cause omitted variable bias in the coefficients of the included variables. One approach to
these two problems is the estimation of several specifications using different combinalions
11of drunk driving laws. The estimation of three fairly different sets of specifications provides
the means to judge the robustness of the results with respect to the problems of eollinearity
and omitted variables. There are six regressions in each specification set. In each set, the
regressions have different dependent variables but the same independent variables. The
results are presented in Tables 2 through 7.'
The first set of specifications includes only one drunk driving law along with the
control variables. These specifications are preseoted in Tables 2 and 3, and are labeled
Single Law Specification. Each panel in these tables represents a separate regression in
which only the coefficient(s) for the drunk driving law is presented. There is no collinearity
between the drsjnk driving laws since only one law is included in each regression. However,
eollinearity between the included drunk driving law and other alcohol control policies could
still be a problem. Also, excluding the other drunk driving laws may create an omitted
variables bias.
The second specification includes all drunk driving laws. These results are presented
in Tables 4 and 5,andare labeled Extended Specification. These models are important
since they minimize omitted variables bias. They are, however, sobjeet to collinearity since
many of these laws are enacted jointly.
The third specification includes the control variables and a limited set of drunk
driving laws. The results arc presented in Tables 6 and 7, which are labeled Limited
Specification. These specifications attempt to provide a balanced solution to the problems
of collinearity and omitted variables. These models reduce collioearity since they include
fewer dronk driving laws than are included in the Extended Specification. The laws included
in the Limited Specification were those that consistently matched a priori expectations in the
prior specifications. The drunk driving laws included are the preliminary breath test, no plea
bargaining, dram shop, administrative per se, and maodatory fine and license sanction laws.
These models also reduce the problem of omitted variable bias relative to the Single Law
Of the other specifications tested one set merits some additional attention. Arteospts were made to
estimate fixed effects models by including dummy variables for all but one of the states in the sample, as
welt as an sdaptatioo of Searte's (1971) procedure provided by Willard Manning. colinearity made it
impossible to obtain meaningful results from these altemative specifications.
12Specification since they include six drunk driving laws.
An important advantage of these regression models over previous research is the
inclusion of variables representing a wide variety of alcohol control policies. This allows for
comparisons of the effectiveness of each policy. However, computation of elasticities is not
appropriate for policies which arc modeled with dichotomous variables or with several
variables. An alternative method of assessing the relative effectsof the various alcohol
controlpolicies is to simulate the number of lives that might have been saved by these
policies.
Simulations of alternative policies usingthe regression coefficients from the Limited
Specificationswere performed by first predicting the actual number of fatalities in the 48
contiguous states of theU.S. from 1982through 1988. Thetotalnumber offatalitiesis then
re-estimated changing theappropriate independent variable(s) to reflectthepolicy being
simulatedand compared tn actual fatalities. Finally, for the drunk driving deterrence laws,
the number of fatalitiesaverted as a resultof existing laws is alsoestimatedby re—estimating
toLal fatalities in the absence of the law being examined.
Tables 8 and 9 contain the results of these simulations for the three total and age-
specific fatalityrates, respectively.The firstvalue,in each cell,is theaverage annual
predicted reduction in fatalities due to the policy being simulated. The second represents
the percentage reduction in fatalities resulting from the simulated policy. For the drunk
driving laws, each cell contains twoadditionalvalues: thenumber of fatalities avertedby
existinglawsand the percentage reduction in fatalitiesthisrepresents (compared10 the
estimated fatalities in the absence of the lawunderconsideration).The estimated number
offatalities which could be averted by the policy being simulated depends on both the
regression coefficients and thenumberof states thathad thepolicy in effect from 1982
through 1988. This increases astheabsolute valueof the coefficientincreasesand decreases
as the number of states with thepolicy increases. The full impact of each deLerrence
measurecanbecompared by summing the number of fatalities averted if all states had a
law with thenumberof fatalities averted by the laws already ineffect.
B. Drunk Driving andAlcoholRelated Policy Variables
The preliminary breathtest lawis negative and significant in all but one of the models
13presented.e A comparison of fatality rates generallyreveals the expectedpattern of larger
coefficienls for the more alcohol involved fatality rates. There is generally no difference in
the osagoitude of the coefficients across the three alternative specifications or among 18 to
20 year olds. Clearly, states with a preliminary breath test law have significantly lower motor
vehicle accident fatality rates than states without this law. The simulations predict that if all
states had a preliminary breath test during the sample period, average annual fatalities
would have been reduced by approximately 3.4 percent, with about 20 percent of this
reduction taking place among 18 to 20 year olds. As expected, about 90 percent of the total
reduction would have occurred among alcohol involved drivers, Existing preliminary breath
test laws are estimated to have saved approximately 1,067 lives each year. Thus, the
marginal effect of going from no breath test laws to every state enacting a breath test law
is estimated to he 2,579 lives per year.
The indicator for laws limiting the use of plea bargaining in drunk driving cases is
negative and significant in 13 of the 18 models. A comparison of fatality rates reveals a
pattern of larger coefficients for the nighttime driver fatality rates than for the others, while
little difference is observed between the results for 18 to 20 year olds and the full sample.
Also, larger coefficients are observed in the Extended specification relative to the Single and
Limited specifleatioos. The empirical results provide evidence of a negative effect of a no
plea bargaining law on drunk driving fatality rates. Simulations indicate that a national no
plea bargaining law would have reduced night driver fatalities (where it was most significant)
by approximately 7.9 percent. About 16 percent of all fatalities averted by this law would
have been in the 18 to 20 year old group. An estimated 543 fewer night driver fatalities
were predicted when comparing the national no plea bargaining law simulation to that where
no state had a law.
The administrative per se law is significant in 12 of the models. Most of these
significant estimates are in the total fatality regressions including more than one law. There
is very little variation io the magoitude of the significant coefficients. Simulations imposing
a Alt statement concemtog signtticsnce are based on tests done at the ten-percent significance level,
These rests are one.raited r-sests fortawsmodeled with one variable and are F-tears of joint significance for
laws modeled wtth more thou one vartable.
14a mandatory license sanction of one year (the most severe penalty in place in 1988) suggest
that administrative per selaws cansignificantlydeter drunken driving as long as relatively
severesanctions are imposed. Existing laws, with relatively weak penalties, are found to
have no deterrent effect. However, imposing a mandatory one year administrative sanction
in all states would have reduced total fatalities by 4,202., with about 19 percent of the
reduction occurring in the 18 to 20 year old group.
Mandatory minimum fines are found to be significant in 10 of the 18 alternative
specifications. All of the significant estimates occur in the models using the night driver or
alcohol involved driver fatality rate as the dependent variable. This is a reasonable result
since the effects of the deterrents are expected to be more obvious in the more alcohol
involved regressions. Also, a comparison of the 18 to 20 age group with the full sample
reveals somewhat smaller and less significant coefficients for youths. No systematic
difference in the magnitude of the coefficients is observed among the three alternative
specifications. These results suggest that mandatory fines do deter drunk driving although
the effect on young drivers may be weaker. Again, the simulations indicate that the
effectiveness of the mandatory fines appears to depend on relatively large fines being
imposed. Uniformly imposing a mandatory nominal fine of $500 would have reduced alcohol
involved driver fatalities by 2,738 per year, about 19 percent of these fatalities, with about
12 percent of the reduction taking place among 18 to 20 year olds. The marginal effect on
alcohol involved drivers of going from no states with a mandatory minimum fine to all states
imposing mandatory fines of $500 is estimated to be 2,916 lives.
The deterrent effect of a mandatory license action was found to be significant in 5
of the models presented. However, the signs of the coefficients on the two variables
capturing these penalties were consistent with a deterrent effect in all but one of the models
presented. Again, Ihe significant effects were observed only in the models using a dependent
variable representing greater alcohol involvement. The results were also significant in
specifications using all ages. These results indicate that the impact of a mandatory license
sanction is limited to older drivers. Simulating the impact of a national mandatory license
sanction of one year indicates that approximately 647 fewer alcohol involved driver fatalities
would have occurred in each year when compared to the situation where no states imposed
15this type of mandatory penalty. As before, the estimated impact of the relatively weak
existing mandatory license sanctions indicates that these penalties must be fairly severe to
have any deterrence effeel
The dram shop law is negative and significant in all but one of the models presented.
As expected, a comparison of fatality rates generally reveals a pattern of larger coefficients
for the more alcohol involved fatality rates. Also, a comparison of the 18 to 20 age group
with the full sample reveals a clear pattern of smaller and less significant coefficients for
youths. This result is not surprising since, during the period examined, the minimum legal
drinking age was 21 in many states. Young people would, therefore, have difficulty receiving
service in the on-premise drinking establishments where the dram shop laws are expected
to have the greatest impact. Simulations indicate that the enactment of a dram shop law in
those states without one during the 1982 to 1988 period would have reduced total fatalities
by 852 per year. About 62 perceot of the fatalities averted by this policy would have been
in the alcohol involved driver group. A relatively low proportion of this reduction would
have occurred among 18 to 20 year olds. Comparing the national dram shop law case to the
situation where no state has a dram shop law iodieates that the marginal effect of this law
is 2,436 lives per year, a reduction in total fatalities of 5.3 percent.
The real beer tax coefficients are negative and significant at the one percent level in
all specifications reported. A comparison of fatality rates generally reveals a pattern of
larger coefficients for the more alcohol involved fatality rates. Also, a comparison of the 18
to 20 age group with the full sample reveals a clear patLern of larger coefficients for the
younger age group.Finally, a comparison of the Extended specification and Limited
specification reveals generally that the magnitude of the coefficients are larger in the
Exteaded specifications. These results suggest that beer taxes have a negative effect on
drunk driving and that this effect is larger for young driver than for nlder drivers.
Collinearity may be a problem in the Extended specification.
Three alternative increases in the beer tax are simulated. The first is an increase in
the nominal beer tax so that the real beer tax in effect in 1951 is maintained. This is an
increase in the heer tax from 16 cents to 71.6 cents per six-pack and represents a 447
percent increase in the federal beer tax in 1988. The simulations predict that this policy
16would have reduced total fatalities per year, on average, by 5,174 or about 11.5 percent of
all fatalities. This policy would have reduced fatalities in the 18 to 20 year old group by
1,660about32 percent of all fatalities in this group.
The second tax simulation is an increase in the beer tax which equates the tax on the
pure alcohol in beer to the tax on the pure alcohol in distilled spirits. This is an increase
in the beer tax to 78.4 cents and represents a 490percentincrease in the federal beer tax
in 1988. The simulations predict that this policy would have reduced total fatalities per year
by 5,771, or approximately 12-8 percent of all fatalities.This policy would have reduced
fatalities in the 18 to 20 year old group by 1,822 which is about 35.2 percent of all fatalities
in this group.
The final tax policy simulated is the doubling of the tax to 32 cents per six-pack called
for in the deficit reduction package of 1990. The simulations predict that fliis policy would
have reduced total fatalities per year by 1,744 which is about 3.9 percent of all fatalities.
This policy would have reduced fatalities in the 18 to 20 year old group by 611 which is
about 11.8 percent of all fatalities in this group.
For each of the tax policies, a comparison of fatality rates shows that the magnitude
of the effect increases with the degree of alcohol involvement. About 75 percent of the
fatalities averted by these policies would be in the alcohol involved driver group. A
comparison of fatality rates for 18 to 20 year olds also shows that the magnitude of this
effect increases with the degree of alcohol involvement. About 32 percent of all fatalities
averted, of all ages, would have been in the 18 to 20 year old group.
The elasticity of the beer tax with respect to total fatalities was estimated for both the
18 to 20 year old group and for all ages- The younger group was expected to be more price
responsive than the overall population. The elasticity of the beer tax with respect to total
fatalities in the 18 to 20 year old age group is estimated to be -0.21, and for all ages to be -
0.07.These estimates are consistent with those obtained in nther recent studies. Saffer and
Grossman (1987a) estimated this elasticity for the 18 to 20 year old group to be —0.17.
Evans et. al. (1989) estimated this elasticity for all ages to be —0.11.
The results indicate that the effect of a minimum legal drinking age law is limited to
18 through 20 year olds. The drinking age is negative and significant in all models using
17fatality rates for 18 to 20 year olds, while it attains significance in only the more alcohol
involved measures for the full sample. A comparison of the 18 through 20 year old fatality
races generally reveals a pattern of larger coefficients for the more alcohol involved fatality
rates. The effects of a 21 year old minimum legal purchase age in all states during the
sample period is simulated. The simulations predict that this policy would have reduced
fatalities in the 18 to 20 year old group by 166 per year. This is a small numher since most
states had a 21 year old minimom legal drinking age during the sample period. About 83
percent of the total fatalities averted would have been in the alcohol involved driver
category. To gain some further understanding of the overall impact of legal drinking ages,
the effects of an 18 year old minimum purchase age in all states is also simulated. The
simulations predict that this policy would have increased fatalities in the 18 to 20 year old
group hy 498 per year, with most of the increased fatalities in the alcohol involved driver
category. The marginal effect of going from an 18 to a 21 year old minimum legal purchase
age in all states is thus estimated at 664 lives.
The other DO! and alcohol related laws that were examined are the illegal per s;
implied consent, and npen container laws and the mandatory minimum jail sentences and
community service penalties. The Single Law specifications and the Extended specifications
produced mostly insignificant and positive coefficients or unstable coefficients for these laws.
The results suggest that these laws do not have a deterrence effect and, as a result, were
not included in the Limited specifications and no simulations were performed for them.
C. Alcohol Sentiment Measures
The variable measuring the percentage of the state population in dry counties is
negative and significant in only a few of the specifications presented. This may be due to
the fact that alcohol could he easily purchased in nearby counties. Thus, these results
suggest that local limits on the sale of alcoholic beverages have little impact on drunk
driving.
The Southern Baptist variable is never negative and significant, contrary to
expectations. The coefficients on the remaining religion variables are generally negative and
significant. A comparison of fatality rates with respect to alcohol involvement reveals no
particular pattern. Also, a comparison of the 18 to 20 age group with the full sample reveals
18a general pattern of smaller coefficients for the younger age group. These results suggest
that religious participation ia associated with reduced alcohol abuse.
11 Uighway Conditions
The percentage of drivers eaceeding 5 miles per hour is positive and significant in
all specifications reported, as expected. Total vehicle miles driven per licensed driver was
expected to have a positive impact on fatality rates, since increased driving should increase
the prohahility of an accident. However, this variable was generally negative and
insignificant in the estimated equations. All motor vehicle fatality rates were found to be
positively and significaotly affected by the percentage of drivers ages 15 through 24 in all
estimated specitications. Mandatory safety inspections are expected to improve the quality
of motor vehicles aod, as a result, lower motor vehicle fatality rates. This variable is
negative and significant in all total fatality regressions, but is insignificant in all other
regressions. Mandatory seat belt use laws are expected to increase seat belt use, thereby
lowering the probahility of a fatality in a motor vehicle accident. This variable is negative
and significant in most of the equations estimated. With the exception of the inspection
indicator, a comparison of these results across fatality rates generally reveals a pattern of
larger coefficients for the more alcohol involved fatality rates. The only differences observed
hetween 18 to 20 year olds and the full sample are for the seat belt use laws which are
estimated to have a larger impact on youths.
aEconomicVariables
Since both health and alcohol are normal goods, the effect of income on alcohol
demand is uncertain. However, real income is negative and significant in all specifications
reported. This suggests that the impact of income on health exceeds that of income on
alcohol consumption and drunken driving. A comparison of fatality rates generally reveals
a pattern of larger coefficients for the more alcohol involved fatality rates, while no
differences are observed by age. The unemployment rate is negative and significant in all
specifications reported, indicating that unemployed individuals do less driving and less
drinking away from home. A comparison of total fatality, nighttime fatality and alcohol
involved fatality rates for the full sample and for 18 to 20 year olds shows no particular
pattern for these variables with respect to either alcohol involvement or age.
19V. cONCLUSiONS
Based on the regression and simulation results, the relative effectiveness of all major
drunk driving legislation, beer taxes and the minimum legal drinking age can he compared.
In several cases these comparisons depend on how severe a policy js assumed, since
sanctions can be set at relatively low or relatively high levels. The most severe mandatory
minimum sanction in effect in any state, in 1988, is used in the simulations. Simulations
using less severe penalties, which were not presented, implied that sanctions have to he
severe to he effective.
The most effective policies are the beer Lax and the relatively severe admioistrative
license action of one year. An increase in the beer tax to its real value in 195] would
decrease fatalities by 11.5 percent. A mandatory minimum administrative penalty of one
year decrease fatalities by about nine percent. However, the relatively weak administrative
penatties currently in place have little, if any, deterrent effect.
The next most effective policies are a 21 year old minimum legal drinking age, a
preliminary breath test law, a dram shop law, and the relatively high mandatory minimum
tine of $500.Thesepolicies each reduce total motor vehicle fatalities by about five to six
percent.! Finally, the no plea bargaining law and the mandatory minimum license action
of one year each reduce total fatalities by about one percent.'5
The other deterrent laws, which include mandatory jail sentences, community service
laws, and open container laws were not found to act as deterrents to drunk driving.
Art 18 year old drinking age is assumed as she altemative drinking age. The Ewe percent estimate is
based oo the number of 18 to 20 year old fatalities averted as a percent of total faralitiee. Also, the
alternative drunk driving policies are no law to be to effect in any ssate.
/s 'Theestimate for the no plea bargaining law was computed using the number of ntghr driver fatalities
averted as a percent of soca! fatalities.
20Table 1
DefInitions ard Macnoof Variables
Variable Definition rnid Mean
Total Fatality Rate Total rotor vehicle fatalities per100,000population.918.840
Might Driver Fatality Total driver deatha occurring betaeen 12:00 a.rn. and5:59a.m. in mator vehicle
Rate accidents per100,000population. ia2.271
Alcohol InvolvedDriverEstimated altohol involved,driver deathsin motor oahlcie accidantsper 100.000
Fatality Rate population. 9a5,950
ToothFatalityRate Total 18to20 year old deatha inmotorvehicle accidents per100,000population
ages18 to 20. p54.072
Youth light Driver Total driver deaths, ages 18 to 20 years, occurring between 12:00 a-rn. and3:59
FatalityRate an, in motor vehicle atcidcnls per 100,000 poputaclon egos 18 to 20. 9—9.991
Tooth Alcohol Innolved Estimated alcohol invoiced driver deaths, ages 18 to 20 years, in castor vehicle
Driver Fatality Rate accidents par 100,000poçroiatisn afee 18 to20. 918.870
lnpliad Consent Law Dichotocrtts indicator of state lou requiring a license Ranction upon refusal to
sttnit to a chanital test for alcohol. it°t.026
Mandatory Minina.eo Mandatory oinieaan license suspension orrevocation, in dayt, for refusal to
lop1 iSConsent Penaltysttanittoa chemical test fer otcohoi. t125. 131
PerDc RAtvO.080 Dichotans Indicttor that equals one ifthestate has an illegal perCe laa
which applies at a RAt of 0.08%. ta=D.OID
PertaEAt=0.1D% Dichotcasoua indicator that equals nonifthe state has an illegal perse taa
ahichapplies ata RAt of 0.10%. tavD,7R4
ParSe RAtabove0.10%Dichotomous indicator that equalsensIf the otate hoe an iltegai percclaw
which applies at RAts greater then 0.10%. avO.045
Mandatory Dlehocasous Indicator that equals one if thestate has a law catting for a
AthvinlotrstivePer So mandatory adsinistrntive driver license suspension or ravucatian afcor first
Law arrest for 001. jaaD.11D
Mandatoryifinies,an Mandatory ainineau adeinistrative driver lIcensesusponofon or revocation, in
AdeinlotrarivePenaltydays, after first arrest for 001. in10.609
Mlnlaa.aoLegal DrinkingMinina,eo iegaidrinkingage, in years. for the purchase and eonutalçTlanofbeer
Age with an alcohol cooteorof sorethan 3.2%, adjustedforgrandfather clauses,
p2D.25D
Pralialnarybreath TentDichotosoun indicator that equals one ii thestats has a law which authorioms the
policeto adninioter a pre-arrest breath tett far alcohol. p0.027
Open tontainer Dichatoootao indicator that equaia one if the state has a law making It an offense
to have an open container of an mlcoholic beverage in the passenger casparceent
of a motor vehicle.yoO.386
Mo Plea Rargaining Dichotomous indicator that equate ova if the ttate hae a law requiring
prosecutors to try an individualforDill if arrested for Out. yoO,217
Mandatory Fine Dichotcoeus indicator that equals one ifthestats has a law requiring a inlnioaae
fine upon first conviction foe 001. p=O.3l4
Meal Mandatory Minicsas Mandatory miniesin fine, in dollarn, for first conviction for 001, divided by the
pine tonuuemr Prico dee tlOfTlOt). ev0.296
Mandatory License Oichotomouo Indicator that equals one if the state has a laa requiring a miniesan
Motion license suspension or revocation upon first conviction for EkIi. p—D.295
Mandatory Minirn.av Mandatory elnintan driver licensa sonpenalon or revocation, In daya, upon first
License Action conviction for 001. a'?l.DDl
Mandatory Jail tentenca Dichotomous Indicator that eqoala one if the atete has a lea requiring a niniesan
jail sentence upon first conviction for DUI. pvt.164
21Mandatory Miniesun Jail Nondatory elniosas jail sentence, In days,'on first coewietlon for DUL iwo.3t7
Sentence
tooneltyService in iichotcrous indicator that equalsoneIf the state alloen cnieoeilty aervice It
Lieuofdell lieu of • etarCatory jell sentence Lçoek first conviction for DUL srf.142
MiniosinCoenaiity Minisoan cceeuiity service, in hours, In lieu of jail sentence open first
tervice conviction for pill7.l26
Rroe shop Dichotcraouo indicetor thot eqiotnone ifthe state he. either a etatote or case
law eutharlolng parties injured by en intosicated individualtofile a leasuit
uguinat the server of the alcoholic beverages. iooD.tf4
Reel Beer Tao 5,-un Cf Pederal and state ecvioe haves, in dollars, on a 24-tnt case of 12-osasce
contoinero of beerdividedby the CPIs2.fQ339
RoolIncome Percopit. sootypersonalmontedividedbythe CPI. js=35.9fl
Unaegaloenc Rate Arstuolaverage state ureeçloyrnent rote. l'•7.444
Maceat Percentsge of the state populotionalto are Moreene. p1.233
touthern Roptict Percentageof the state population alto ere southern Baptists. it.7.163
Catholic Percentage of the state popoilotion alto sre Catholic. uo2O.588
Puoteatent Percentage of the state population altosre Proteatsnt, escinding Raritan and
Southern Boptioto. p2S.R52
Percent Dry Percentage of the state populotionlivingIn cct.uitleo prohIbiting the sale of
alcoholicbeveragescc4.513
fehielaMiLes fohicle siles traveled, in hundred thousands ofmiles perlicensed driver.
1t0.0W
Totng trivers Freotion of licensed driversages 24 years sit toter.jwO.18t
Lnopectlano Dichocoimusvariablethat equals eRie if. safety inspectionof netter vehicles Is
requiredeeery yeer istl.444
Seatsalt foe Dichotonouo verlabte that equals one If the state has a martofory seat beltone
last.soo.3e5
Percent Over55ir1sh Percentage of highway traffic exceeding 65ci leo per hour. ite9.612
All Coons are weighted by the total stote population eocept for the age specific fetolity retes 'inch are
oeinhted by the relevoft age specific state popotacion. All dato are far the 48 contiguous states of the U.S.
fret 1982 through 1988,
22TabLe); tingle Law Specification, NIL Ages'
Independent Variable TotaL Highttine Alcohol
- Drioer lrivoLyed0river
Penal N; Preliminary Breath Teat
PreLieinary Breath Teat -O.072•" -81t9°•-0193°••
(-3.99) (-4.20) (-5.98)
PanelB; Mo PLeaBaroalnirea
lbPLeaNargaining -0.028 -0.146" -lL100"
(-1.22) (-4.43) (-2.29)
Panel C, 0r Shorn
Drata shop 0.06500 -0.074 -t.125°°°
t'3.5O) (-2.75) (-3.61)
Panel04 Athiniotrative Per Be Laws
MandatoryNdeiniotrative Per Sm Law 0.1051*0 -0.033 -0.120
1L24) (-0.67) (-1.90)
MandatoryMiniaa.oa Athninittrative Penalty -0.001"' 0.04002 0.0002
(-2.50) (0.06) (0.41)
panelE; Finoc
Mandatory Pine 0.007 0.095" 0.204"
(0.12) (1.22) (2.07)
Real Mandatory Miniaa.ai Fire -0.016 .0.163*0 -0.255°°
(-0.27) (-2.03) (-2.46)
Penal F; License Sunoenabon or #e*ccation
MandatoryLicenseAction 0.002 0.R74 0.058
(0.00) (2.27) (1.37)
Mandatory Mlnlea.an License ActIon '0.00001 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-0.03) 4-hg)) (-1.41)
Panel C,PerSo Laws
Per Sm BAC.0.085 QØ4)a51 .0267000 -0.042
40.0.4) (-2.47) (-0.32)
Per 0 BACO.10% 0.060°" 0.0500.0 0.071
42.605 (1.05) (1.64)
Per Re MAC above 010t -0.082" .0.104*0* -0.061
(-1.90) (-hd6) (-0.75)
Panel AtlionliadConsent Lava
ioplled Consent Law 0M42°'00.17r -0117
(—1.60) 1-4.79) (-2.41)
MandatoryRbniasss lepLiad Consent PenaLty 0.00040*0 0.003 0.00010k
(3.70) (3.84) (0.66)
Panel I;enContainer
OpenContainer 0.015 -0.024 -0.030
10.81) (-0.87) (-0.03)
PondJtJailtancancao
MatotoryJail tentence 0.21000* 0.124' 0,110000
(3.43) (1.42) 1-1.09)
Martetory Minleun Jail Sentence .0.004000 -0.026° 0.141000
(-2.821 ('0.61) (2.79)
Panel C, Ceatn.o,it-s'Setyire
Canounity Service in Lieu ofJail 0080°°° .0.0540*0 -0243°°°
(1.54) (-0.68) (-2.48)
Minlea.an Ccmesnity Service 0.00040*0 0.00200* ODCT°°
(OAR) (1.91) 04.18)
All equations IncLade the control variables described abova t-ratioo are In psrentheoes.°°, °' and *
represent statistically significantcoefficients at the one,five, and ten percent significance Levels,
respectively, titian ecanining the lows .Seled by more then ore variable, the significance Lava) indicated ia
based on an F-test of the joint significance of the variablea capluring the law in quaatianPEnaLty, the F
statisticIs aignificant st the onepercent significance level in mlt equations.
23TabLe 3: SIngle Law Opeifloatlan, 10-20'





8 .10 Pica. Baraainina
Ho PLea Bargaining 4.053°° 0.151 O.I270
(-1.92) (-3.41) (-2.71)
PaneLC:Ores Shop
Ores Shop .0f5fieaa •0.O58 .0.0790*
(-2.59) (-1.62) (-2.01)
Panel 0: btheleletratiee Per (a Lisa
MandatoryA'*ainietretivePet SeLaw O.O69 0.005 -0.032
(1.13) (0.07) t-1.1S)
Mandatory MlninnsiAoalniatratlvePenaLty -0.0O1 0.0004 -0.0003
(-2.62) (-0.02) (-0.53)
Panel E:Pines
MandatoryPine -0.031 -t.021° 0.151"
(-1.41) (-0.21) (1.44)
ReaL MandatoryMinie.aa Pine 0.035 .3,357fl -0.232"
(0.52) (—0.03) (-2.11)
PanelC: Licenop Suspenolan arRevocation
Mandatory License Action 0.017 -0.006 0.054
(3M) (—0.13) (1.19)
Mandatory Mlplaan Licence Action -0.00004 -0.0001 -0.0001
(-0.29) (-0.36) (-0.66)
Panel0:Per Se Laws
Per Os RACaO.06% 0.050' 0365° 0.020'
(0.13) (-2.34) (0.14)
Per Os SAC'OlOt Oosla o.oir° 0.102"
1.49) (0.15) (2.24)
Per Sn SAC above 0.10% .0.0130 .059)t* .Q5545a
(—1.43) (-1.16) (-0.61)
PenaL a: topLied Conaent nan
ispI lad Consent Las 0.O23. -0.053 -0.055
(0.14) (-1.04) (-L04)
Mandatory Minina.aelaplied Consent Penalty 0.0002" 0.00003 -0.0001
(1.19) (0.12) (-0.45)
PaneL C;
Open Container 0.005 -0.128 3.053k
(0.10) (-0.76) (-h35)
PaneL J, JñL10nteaea
Mandatory delL tesdance 0.246" 0.095 O.049°
(3.17) (0.10) (0.42)
Mandatory Min(ia.an Jail Sentence .00510*t -0.108 0.171005
(-2.35) (-0.14) (1.31)
two)t; tcaaa.a,itySArd.co
Ceisa.a'lty(arvicel Lieu of Jail .OOSAaaa-0.16s• .o.524.aa
(-0.55) (-1.53) (-3.06)
Miniee.an Coaire.anity tansies 0.002" 0.004" 0.000aea
(1.19) (L47) (4.52)
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30412table 5 Doranded Specification4 18-20
IrniapersOentVari.bie lotal Biglittime Alcohol
Driver InvolvedOriver
Reel boone '0.O3r o,o45** -0.059"
(-&44) (-5.49) (-7,55)
Percentage Ecceeding AS .çth 0.016" 0.017"* 0.01810,
(4.53) (237) (3.03)
TotalYehicle Miles Driven -1.524 10.276 -18.877°
(-0.24) (-0.93) (-1.76)
Percentage nf YoungDrivers 2.149°" 2.695°" 3.693°°°
(3.73) (2.00) (3.88)
SafetyInspections .Q397**o (,Q54* -0.032
(-3.98) (-1.29) (-0.80)
teat Belt Law -0382°" -3,075'
(-2.901 (-1.52) (-3.69)
Urteep(syaFn( Rote -0.047"' -0347"' -0.057"
(-7.30) (-4.16) (-5.38)
Dry -0.0003 -0.003 0.001
(-0.19) (-1.36) (0.42)
Monooos -0.011°" -0.005 -0010'•°
(-4.69) (—1.17) (-2.61)
Southern Baptists 0364' 5.006 0.006
(1.84) (1.41) (1.54)
Catholics -ofM3°°° -0.001 -0.003'
(-4.99) (-032) (-1.82)
Protestants -0.008°" 0.001 410(5*
(4.59) (0.28) (-1.65)
Mioiosat Legal Drinking Age -0.044" 41954• .5,90540*
(-3.38) (-2.46) (-3.93)
teal Beer Tee -86.233°°° -102.116" -117.256"
(-7.77) (535) (-6.36)
PreliotinaryBreath Test -0.069"' '0.029 '0)16'"
(-2.80) (-0.70) ('2.81)
Ho Pies Bargaining -0.158°" -0.227°" .0.22840w
('4.56) (-5.80) (-3.81)
OruotShop -0.032' -0.046 -0.055°
(-1.41) ('1.26) ('1.37)
Mandatory Adoinistratlve Per Se Law •0,045'°° -0.056" -0.164°"
(-1.01) (-0,77) ('2.20)
MandatoryMiolossoAdolnletratiye Penalty -0.001" —0.001" 0.0004*0*
(-2.43) (-1.53) (-0.72)
Mandatory Fine -0.095 -0.002' 0.133
(-1.48) ('0.76) (1.30)
Real Morciatory Minioa.ao Rine 0.002 .0.0180 0.i60
(1.23) (-0,36) ('1.47)
Mandatory License Action -0.022 41.033 0.046
('0.61) (-0Th) (1.09)
Mandatory Minioa.ao Uterine Action -0.00004 -0.0001 -0.0002
('0.38) (-0.20) t-L21)
Per 0* OAC'O.OaX 0.131° -0.315' 0,081"
(1.49) (—1.82) (0.53)
Forte BAC*O.105 0.0550 0.049' 0.1884°'
(2.06) (1.09) (4.26)
Per Se BAG above 0.100 -0343° '0.006° 0)55°"
(-0.77) (—0.06) (1.66)
)optied Consent Law -0.013°" -0,054°' -0,043
(-0.41) (-1.01) (-0.80)
Mandatory Mlnlouo )rpiied Consent Penalty 0.001'" 0.001" 0.001
(4.20) (2.40) (1.78)
Open ContaIner -0.038° -0.046 -0.060'
(—1.41) (—1.01) (—1.33)
Mandatory Jail Sentence 0.171" 0.111 0.025
(2.00) (0.76) (0.1B)
Mandatory Ilioiie.uo Jail Sentence -0.092°' -5.044 0.023
('2.44) (-0.70) (0.38)
Cnmsi,ityService in Lieu ofJail -0.101" -0.224" -0.355"
(-1.62) (-2.00) (-3.39)
Minlocn Ccaoaacanlty Service 0.005°" 0.007"' 0.01o0
(436) (3.62) (5.44)
B2 0.632 0.697 0.790
37.61 17.34 28.28
- See note to Tab),2.
26Table 6! Liioitnd Specification, All Aeo
lrdapeeaantVariable Total Nighttiee Alcohol
Driver involved Driver
Healincealie 0.038°'° -0.029'°° 0.048°°°
1-7.62) 1-5.25) (-6.68)
Percentage eeceedirig 65 1di 0.015°'° 0.017'°' 8.025°°°
(5.04) (3.96) (4.62)
TotalVehIcle Miles Drioen 4.618 2.759 -8.755
(-0.79) (0.34) (4.85)
Percentageof Tou!g (rivers 1.254°" 1.941" 3.029°°°
(2.58) (2.89) (3.49)
Safety inspectiono O.05600a 0.012 0.021
(.2.79) (0.43) (0.19)
Seat Belt Lea -0.040° 0.047° -0087°°
(-1.62) (-136) (-1.93)
tlnaeployennt Rate 4.042°°° 4.022°°° o.o400a.
(-7.49) (-2.86) (-4.09)




Southern Haptioto 0.001 0.0003 -0.003
(0.45) (0.12) (-0.83)
Catholics -0.D1l°°° -0005°" -0812°°
(-8.26) (285) (-5.00)
Protestants 0011°°° -0.001 4.006°'
(-7.95) (-0.69) (-2.49)
Minlia.ai Legal Drinking Age 0.801 -0.018 8.054°°°
(0.14) (-1 .24) (-2.99)
Real Seer Tax -1939°°° -43.235°° -50325°"
(-2.73) (-4.21) (-336)
Preliainary Breath Test 4.058°°° 0.S7D°°° -0.163°"
(-3.114) (-2.6.4) (4.90)
Ho Plea BarBoinina (.008 0.1t3°°° -0.035
10.32) 1-2.93) 4-0.88)
Orsn Shop .0.054000 S.t73°°° -lLlt)°°°
(-2.79) (-2.7)) (-2.98)
landatory Alniniotrative Per Se Law S.OPT°°° 0.072 .0.14400
t3.52 (-1.52) (-2.431
MandatoryMiniosin Aohiniotretive Penalty 4.Ot)°°' 0.0005 03002°°
(-2.34) (0.31) (0.59)
Mandatory Fine 0.018 0.068°° 0.191°°
10.32) (8.92) (2.04)
heal Mandatory Miniu9.ls Fine -0.035 -0134°° -0.262°°
(-0.62) (-1.72) (2.66)
Mandatory License ActItn 0.013 0.080°° 0.588°
(5.57) (236) (2.20)
Mandatory Minina License Action 0.00002 4.0003°° 43004°
(-0.13) (-2.08) (-L79)
R2 - 5.759 0.543 8.672
F 33.31 1236 21.65
- tae once toTable2-
27fable 7r Limited Opeclffeatlen, 15-20'
ledeperident Variable Total Nf.ghttfo.a Alcohol
Driver Involved Driver
Real tncnse -0332' -0.038•" 0.046"
(-6.86) (-4.84) (-5.9T)
percentage eoceading 65t 0.016" O.Ol7' 0328"
(4.501 (L94) (332)
Total Vehicle Mi lea Driven -0.74% -10.175 -25.11P'
(-0.11) (-0.92) (-2.24)
Percentage of l'ocrig Driver. 1.605e 2.471" 3.042"
(2.79) (2.68) (3.22)
Safety Inspections .Q•Q53" -0.014 0.002
(-2.24) (-0.38) (-0.04)




Dry -0.002 -0305" -0301
(-1.23) (-2.14) (-0.61)
Moriieciv -0.0l0" -0.005" -o.olonv
(-4.54) (-2.24) (-2.75)
Southern BaptIste -0.002 0.001 0.002
1-0.69) (0.29) (0.41)
CaSitoItce .0.011a 03045 -0.008"
(-7.72) (-1.68) (-3.08)
Protestante -0.008"' 0.003 0.0005
(-433) (0.98) (0.19) MiniiaeiLegalDrinking Age 5041'" -0055" -0.090'—
(-3.42) (-2.71) (-436)
Reel Beer Inn -62.Z50'" ..79953na -83.393"
(-7.20) (-5.54) (-5.92)
Preltnlrgry Sraath lees 0.100*'* 0.062,, 0.173"'
(-447) ('1.70) (-4.1))
NoPlea Bargain rig -0.013 -0393" 0345
(-0.63) (-L94) (-034)
SmShop -0.036' '0.053* .&057
(-1.56) (-L43) (-1.52) MaSatory Adoinietrative Per Se Las tOSS' -0.042 -6.100"
(1.41) (-0.62) (-1.65)
MaMatory Mininet Athainigtratlve Penalty -0301' -0.0004 -00803"
(-228) (-0.76) (-0.67)
Naitatory FIns -0.037 0031" 0.131"
(-0.58) (-0.31) (1.29)
Real Maedasory Mlninen Fine 0.034 -0 073" -0.221"
(0.51) (-0.69) (-2.07)
Marelatory License gotten 0.026 0.010 0372
11.00) (0.22) (1.66)
Rardatory Minieoao Llcmmae ActIon 0.00003 -03001 -03002
(-0.26) (-0.44) (-0.03)
B2 0.792 0.661 0.746
40.20 26.45 30.11
See note to Table 2.
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The policy aienjLatiansusethe estimatestrnothe limited vsriablee omdeleEach cell contains estimates or
the absolute change in fatalities per year. on overage, of the aboajlated policy tflrst roe) and the percentage
change in the latality rate resulting Iron the policy sleulation (second row). In addition, the OUt law
aiaajlatlsrm inxltde an estimate of the ouster oflivessaved arrtually on average, as a result of laws already
inplace (third row). and the estimated percentage reduction in the fatality rate frets these existing laws
Ifsurth row)°°°, ", • reprexent oloulatlons based on coeffielanto einlfleant at the 1%, 5%,east10% levels,
rempettively.
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Dee note to TabLe 8.
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